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Notes
CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-RELIGIOUS

INSTRUCTION IN PUBLIC

ScHooLs-A taxpayer, whose young son attended the public
schools, brought an action for a writ of mandamus to require the
board of education to prevent the instruction in and the teaching
of religious education in all public schools and in all public school
houses when occupied by public schools. The writ was denied by
the Illinois Supreme Court.1 That decision was reversed by the
United States Supreme Court and remanded with directions.
Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education of School District No. 71, Champaign County, Illinois, 333 U. S. 203, 68 S.Ct.
461, 92 L.Ed. 451 (1948).
Specifically, the action was brought to abolish the "releasedtime" program of the school system of Champaign County, Illinois. Prior to the inception of this plan, the school week was
organized so that there was one free hour during the week which
was to be used at the teachers' discretion. With the introduction
of this program, part of this hour was utilized for the presentation of religious lessons developed and subsidized by the local
council on religious education. The teachers of these classes were
paid by the council; however, their academic qualifications were
subject to the approval of the superintendent of schools. The
classes were held in the regular school classrooms, after the dissenters had withdrawn. The pupils attended these classes only
upon the written permission of their parents, 2 but those who had
chosen to attend were subject to an absentee report which was
submitted to the secular school authorities.
The governing findings of fact by the Supreme Court were
(1) the use of tax-supported property for religious instruction
and (2) the close cooperation between the school authorities and
the religious council in promoting religious education. Justice
Black, the author of the majority opinion, found the plan squarely
under the ban of the "establishment of religion" clause of the
First Amendment, which is made applicable to the states by the
Fourteenth Amendment.3 His interpretation of this clause was
1. People ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education of School District No.
71, 396 Ill. 14, 71 N.E.(2d) 161 (1947).
2. Parents could choose between classes conducted by the Jewish, Protestant and Catholic faith.
3. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303, 60 S.Ct. 900, 903, 84 L.Ed.
1213, 1218, 128 A.L.R. 1352, 1356 (1940). See Notes (1947) 8 LOuiSIANA LAW
REviEw 136, n. 1, and (1947) 33 Corn. L.Q. 122, for additional citations.
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the same as that which he proclaimed in the Everson case4 of the
preceding year.
It is not here intended to consider the legislative history of
the enactment of this controlling clause of the First Amendment
as differentiated from the subsequent erroneous judicial interpretation of its enactment and purpose.5 , But erroneous as its foundation may be, the supreme court's pronouncement is that the
First Amendment not only forbids Congress to establish a national religion, to aid one religion, or to prefer one religion over
another, but also forbids aid of all religions. No tax, large or
small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions.
This interpretation is not substantiated by history, past decisions, nor by the purported fathers of the doctrine of "separation of church and state," Jefferson and Madison. 7 The Supreme
Court's method is strictly legislative. It interprets church-state
relations on the basis of what it deems to be wise and prudent, as
legislatures do, not on what is the law of the nation. This has
been the trend of this Court for more than a decade. Strange as
it may seem, Justice Black himself, in a dissenting opinion in
Adamson v. California,8pointed out that the Constitution is being
undermined by such tactics. If the charter of our government
needs changing, let it be changed by the legally provided methods.
Even in view of these ominous-sounding tones, perhaps it is
unfair to condemn the court too vociferously for the decision in
this case. It 'perhaps thought rather strong language necessary
to show the stand it intended to take upon any relationship of
church and state, similar to this particular plan, which may
4. Everson v. Board of Education of the Township of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1,
67 S.Ct. 504, 91 L.Ed. 711, 168 A.L.R. 1392 (1947).
5. Dissenting opinion of Justice Reed in the presently discussed case; 1
Annals of Congress 434, 730; Hunt, Life of James Madison (1902) 1012; Comment (1948) 36 Geo. L. J. 631. Contra: Comment (1947) 21 So. Calif. L. Rev. 61.
6. The writer of the najority opinion is unable to cite one applicable
case to substantiate his interpretation.
7. See note 5, supra.
8. After expressing his conviction that the entire Bill of Rights was made
applicable to the state by the Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Black says,
"To hold that this court can determine what, if any, provisions of the Bill
of Rights will be enforced, and if so to what degree, is to frustrate the great
design of a written Constitution." Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46, 89, 67
S.Ct. 1672, 1695, 91 L.Ed. 1903, 1929, 171 A.L.R. 1223, 1249 (1947). Accord: "This
court is forever adding new stories to the temple of constitutional law, and
the temples have a way of collapsing when one story too many is added."
Justice Jackson concurring in Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 181,
63 S.Ct. 877, 889, 87 L.Ed. 1324, 1338 (1942). The same opinion is a dissenting
opinion in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 117, 63 S.Ct. 870, 877, 87
L.Ed. 1292, 1301,146 A.L.R. 81, 109 (1943).
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eventually lead to religious strife and discord. Yet one can but
wonder over the language itself. Potentially, and without straining an interpretation, the applicability of this decision could be
made to declare all released time programs (now involving over
2,000,000 school children9 in forty states)10 unconstitutional. It
could rid the armed service of its chaplains, and could banish
the chapels and religious student centers from the campuses of
all state subsidized schools.'
In short, any relation between
religion per se and the state whereby religion would be the direct
or indirect, or even the incidental, beneficiary of an expenditure
of the tax funds, or of official support, aid or encouragement could
be declared unconstitutional.
Justice Jackson, in a concurring opinion in this case, looks
to the immediate effects of the decision. He voices the opinion
that the supreme court has set itself up as a "super board of education" for every school district in the nation. He also realizes
that this "super board" is likely to be called upon by a plaintiff
to compel the public schools to sift out of their teaching every12
thing inconsistent with his personal religious beliefs.
But from an optimistic, and it is believed, realistic, viewpoint, the above-expressed fears are ill-founded. Never before,
as it is now, has the reading public been unrelentingly bombarded
with printed matter proclaiming that the only logical end-result
of a supreme court's decision would be, from one viewpoint, the
destruction, and from the other viewpoint, the salvation, of our
most sacred religious heritages. The first contention is perhaps
9. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education of School Dist. No. 71,
Champaign County, Ill., 333 U.S. 203, 224, 68 S.Ct. 461, 472, 92 L.Ed. 451, 463
(1948).

10. Gordon v. Board of Education of the City of Los Angeles, 78 Cal.
App.(2d) 464, 479, 178 P.(2d) 488, 497 (1947).

11. The following Louisiana constitutional

provisions lend themselves

more readily to the decisive language of the McCollum case than does the

First Amendment. "Every person has the natural right to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience. No law shall be passed respecting an establishment of religion, nor prohibiting the free exercise thereof; nor shall any preference ever be given to, nor any discrimination made
against, any church, sect, or creed of religion or any form of religious faith
or worship." La. Const. of 1921, Art. I, § 4.
"No money shall ever be taken from the public treasury, directly or indirectly, in aid of any church, sect, or denomination of religion. . . . No appropriations from the State treasury shall be made for private, charitable, or
benevolent purposes to any person or community." La. Const. of 1921, Art.
IV, § 8.
"No public funds shall be used for the support of any private or sectarian

school." La. Const. of 1921, Art. XII, § 13.
12. 333 U.S. 203,
The relator in this
courts not only end
ing which suggests

234, 237, 68 S.Ct. 461, 476, 478, 92 L.Ed. 451, 468, 469 (1948).
case is an avowed atheist and she has asked that the
the "released time" plan but also ban every form of teachor recognizes that there is a God.
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wrong because of ecstatic zeal, the second is wrong because of
gross misunderstanding.
Justice Frankfurter correctly prognosticates the future treatment of this problem by observing that the mere formulation of
a relevant constitutional principle is the beginning of the solution of a problem, not its answer. 13 The meaning of this "separation" doctrine shall be unfolded as appeal is made to the principle from case to case. It is to be hoped that this doctrine will
officially come to express, not absolute separation, but the more
practical relationship between church and state, which to a
tangible extent has existed in this country-that of distinction
and cooperation.14
The Supreme Court could well consider this excerpt from
Gordon v. Board of Education of the City of Los Angeles upon
the presentation of the next released time program:
"No one. . . can deny that instruction of the youth of the
state in faith and morality is of utmost necessity and importance. All too regretfully it must be said that in present-day
American life the family as a unit has not done its part in this
vital field of education of our boys and girls. Else juvenile
courts would not be groaning under an avalanche of cases of
derelictions of children. What more logical advance could be
made in the science of sociology than the unification of religious leaders in a coordinated effort to teach children faith
and morality-and for that purpose to excuse them from
school for one hour a week ...."1'5
Most probably that is the type of reasoning which shall be
utilized to give supreme judicial approbation to a less involved
programthan that found in Champaign County. If, however, the
opposite judicial trend should begin to develop to an alarming
degree, these words of Justice Jackson in Murdock v. Pennsylvania"6' may be efficaciously called to the judicial mind: "Civil
liberties had their origin and must find their ultimate guaranty
13. 333 U. S. 203, 212, 68 S.Ct. 461, 466, 92 L.Ed. 451, 457.
14. As implied by the dissent of Justice Reed in this case and in Chance
v. Mississippi, State Text Book Rating and Purchasing Board, 190 Miss. 453,
200 So. 706 (1941). But the doctrine is more specifically announced, developed
and documented in Parsons, The First Freedom (1948).
15. Gordon v. Board of Education of the City of Los Angeles, 78 Cal.
App.(2d) 464, 479, 178 P.(2d) 488, 497 (1947).
16. Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U. S. 157, 181, 63 S.Ct. 877, 889, 87
L.Ed. 1324, 1338 (1942). The same opinion is a dissenting opinion in Murdock
v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105, 117, 63 S.Ct. 870, 877, 87 L.Ed. 1292, 1301, 146
A.L.R. 81, 109 (1943), cited supra note 9.
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in the faith of the people. If that faith should be lost, five or nine
men in Washington could not long supply its want."-with the
reminder that the converse of that last sentence is also true.
JAMES P. NORRIS, JR.

CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE-ATTEMPT AND CONSPIRACY
SEPARATE INCHOATE OFFENSES-RELIEF BY HABEAS CoRPus-Duhon

was convicted of an "attempt to conspire to commit simple burglary." He claimed that attempted conspiracy is not a crime and
that the sentence and imprisonment were illegal. Without filing
a motion in arrest of judgment or taking an appeal, relator sought
extraordinary relief by a writ of habeas corpus. Held, the sentencing court was without jurisdiction ratione materiae and the
relief prayed, for was properly granted by the district court. State
of Louisiana ex rel. Clarence Duhon v. General Manager,Louisiana State Penitentiary,La. Sup. Ct. Docket No. 39,091 (July 20,
1948) .1
In holding that the criminal code does not contemplate an
offense of attempted conspiracy, Judge Holcombe, whose opinion
was approved without discussion by the supreme court, stressed
the fact that both criminal conspiracy 2 and attempt3 are found
in Chapter V of the criminal code which sets out "inchoate offenses." In these offenses the offender has not completed the basic
crime intended, but is punished because he had a specific intent
to commit the crime and progressed far enough along the road
4
toward its commission that liability should attach.
By virtue of the attempt and conspiracy articles being similarly treated as general inchoate offenses, it must naturally follow that they were intended to be applied separately and must
relate to a specific basic crime. Stressing the language of Article
3, which provides that "The articles of this code cannot be ex1. Decided by Division A of the Nineteenth Judicial District Court and

affirmed with the comment that the opinion was correct by the Louisiana
Supreme Court. No record of the affirmation has yet been published.
2. Art. 26, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
3. Art. 27, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
4. "An attempt is committed where the offender had a specific intent to

commit the crime and went beyond the zone of preparation. A conspiracy is
committed where the offender had a specific intent to commit the crime,
combined with others for that purpose, and committed some act in the
furtherance of that object which might or might not be enough to constitute
an attempt ....
both of these general criminal concepts were intended to
cover a party who specifically -intended to commit one of the basic crimes
listed in the Criminal Code, or elsewhere, but might have been apprehended
before he was able to carry out that criminal purpose." Opinion of Holcombe,
J., p. 2.

